Response to Language, Truth and Logic by AJ Ayer The Nature of Science

Ayer makes the argument that empirical science must serve as the basis of all claims, as it is through empirical science—evidence obtained through the use of the five senses—that one knows reality. Ayer (1990) asks, “What valid process of reasoning can possibly lead [one] to the conception of a transcendent reality?” (p. 4). The answer he provides is that there is no valid process: “Surely from empirical premises nothing whatsoever concerning the properties, or even the existence, of anything super empirical can legitimately be inferred” (Ayer, 1990, p. 4). Ayer’s approach to science, however, is firmly rooted in the traditions fostered during the Age of Reason; prior to that, it was widely accepted that metaphysical reality could be ascertained through the use of logical suppositions. I myself believe there are a number of ways to know the world and to explore. The accumulation of objective data is one way—but there is also the subjective experience, which is gathered in qualitative research, that helps to deepen our understanding of phenomena. I do not discount qualitative research simply because it cannot be backed up by quantitative data or because some do not view it as empirically sound research. If one looks closely at any type of research, controlling for variables and bracketing out bias can be nearly impossible to achieve perfectly. I view the argument made by Ayer regarding metaphysics to be somewhat limited in the same way. For Ayer, the basis of metaphysics is faulty and full of logical missteps. For me, I view metaphysics as something that can be approached logically, as a science, and I do not reject it on the basis that Ayer provides in the outset of the book.

I believe that empirical science can definitely help us to understand the world better, but I also think that metaphysical science can do the same, as it is concerned with the logic of the good, what it is, how it should be pursued, and so on. To assert that there is no verifiable proof of the transcendent reality of the good is to, in my opinion, ignore the piles of evidence—qualitative though it may be—that speak to the existence of the transcendental realities. I am not swayed by empirical evidence alone, nor do I think the world can only be understood by facts and more facts. Dickens argued against such a perspective in Hard Times—and that, to me, has as much validity in the world as any empirical evidence.

The Nature of Facts

I am not opposed to facts, and I appreciate Ayer’s framing of the nature of the nature of facts. His perspective is illuminated by the need for all sentences to be verifiable—but this is quite simply too much to ask, even of the field of science. In research, myriad studies are published, full of facts and empirical evidence—quantitative...

Many of these studies will contradict one another, whether they are on the effects of radiation therapy on the heart or whether they are on the effects of genetically modified corn when consumed by rats. Sample, sample size, research design, and so on—all of it will play a part in the outcome of the study—but so too does bias and the perspective from which the researcher is operating. Not all researchers will present their bias or perspective at the outset. They will hide their orientation and use language that fools the reader of the study into thinking that here is a perfectly objective researcher whose soul interest is in conducting a test and communicating the results. But things are never so simple as that. Otherwise, how could one researcher show that GMO causes cancer and another researcher show that it does not? How could one researcher present data indicating that high fructose corn syrup is a factor in the prevalence of diabetes in the U.S. while another researcher claims that it bears no association to diabetes whatsoever? Researchers should try to be as objective as possible, but I find that they approach the nature of the nature of facts just as subjectively as anyone else because, ultimately, we are all dealing with our own subjective experiences of input—whether we are dealing with them in our mind or through our senses.
How We Understand the World and Ourselves

Ayer (1990) states “that our intellects are unequal to the task of carrying out very abstract processes of reasoning without the assistance of intuition” (p. 46). I can agree with this statement. However, I do not view it as problematic. Ayer does—and he suggests as much when he states, “the power of logic and mathematics to surprise us depends, like their usefulness, on the limitations of our reason” (p. 48). I must ask why I must think of logic and mathematics in terms of a visceral thrill—the thrill of surprise—or why I can only be surprised by something new? On the contrary, the surprise comes from application of the logic and the mathematical formula in the act of creation. Creation is what thrills. We understand the world and ourselves via this creative impulse—it is, after all, what brought us into the world in the first place. Can love be quantified? It is an abstraction and surely it is one that is intuited. People base their whole lives on pursuing it—but does the lack of empirical evidence explaining the process of love make it less valid than a mathematical expression?

We understand ourselves and the world because we experience it, because we reflect on it, we think about it, and we engage with it. The problem of insisting too much on facts, on quantitative data, to make sense of the world and of ourselves, is that it discounts…